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Abstract
Features of security classifiers have various costs to be
manipulated. The costs are asymmetric across features and to
the directions of changes, which cannot be precisely captured
by existing cost models based on Lp-norm robustness. In
this paper, we utilize such domain knowledge to increase
the evasion cost against security classifiers, specifically, tree
ensemble models that are widely used by security tasks. We
propose a new cost modeling method to capture the domain
knowledge of features as constraint, and then we integrate
the cost-driven constraint into the node construction process
to train robust tree ensembles. During the training process,
we use the constraint to find data points that are likely to be
perturbed given the costs of the features, and we optimize the
quality of the trees using a new robust training algorithm. Our
cost-aware training method can be applied to different types
of tree ensembles, including random forest model that cannot
be robustly trained by previous methods. Using twitter spam
detection as the security application, our evaluation results
show that training cost-aware robust model can rank high cost
features as the most important ones, and increase the adaptive
attack cost by 6.4× compared to the baseline.
1 Introduction
Many machine learning classifiers are deployed in security-
critical settings where adversaries try to evade them almost
as soon as they are deployed. Unlike perturbing features (e.g.,
pixels, words) in non-security related applications, manipulat-
ing security features incurs very different costs. For example,
it is cheaper to purchase new domain names than to rent new
hosting servers to evade a spam filter [33]. In addition, a fea-
ture may be expensive to increase, but easy to decrease. For
example, it is easier to remove a signature from a malware
than to add one signed by Microsoft to it [24]. We need cost
modeling methods to capture such security domain knowl-
edge, and utilize the knowledge to increase the cost of evading
security classifiers.
However, existing cost modeling based on Lp-norm is not
suitable for security, since it assumes uniform cost across dif-
ferent features and symmetric cost to increase and decrease
the features. Attacks and defenses under Lp-norm are limited
at evaluating and increasing the robustness of security classi-
fiers against realistic adversaries who are aware of such costs.
Moreover, many recent works focus on improving the robust-
ness of neural network models [16,18,22,32,34,36,37,46–49],
whereas security applications widely use tree ensemble mod-
els such as random forest (RF) and gradient boosted decision
trees (GBDT) to detect malware [30], phishing [15, 19, 23],
and online fraud [28, 38, 44], etc. Despite their popularity, the
robustness of these models, especially against a strong adver-
sary is not very thoroughly studied [10, 26, 40]. The discrete
structure of tree models brings new challenges to the robust-
ness problem. Training trees does not rely on gradient-guided
optimization, but rather by enumerating potential splits to
maximize the gain metric (e.g., Information gain, Gini im-
purity reduction, or loss reduction). Integrating additional
knowledge makes the enumeration intractable.
In this paper, we propose a systematic method to train
cost-aware robust tree ensemble models for security, by inte-
grating domain knowledge of feature manipulation costs. To
address the aforementioned challenges, we first propose a cost
modeling method that projects the domain knowledge about
features into cost-driven constraint. Then, we integrate the
constraint into the training process as if an arbitrary attacker
under the cost constraint is trying to maximally degrade the
quality of potential splits (Equation (10) in Section 3.2.2).
We propose an efficient robust training algorithm that solves
the maximization problem across different gain metrics and
different types of models. Notably, our robust algorithm can
train random forest in scikit-learn (e.g., using entropy or Gini
impurity), widely used by security applications, which cannot
be robustly trained by the previous method [10]. Lastly, we
evaluate adaptive attack against our robust training method,
as a step towards understanding robustness against realizable
attacks. We propose an attack cost function as the minimiza-
tion objective of the strongest whitebox attacker against tree
ensembles (the Mixed Integer Linear Program attacker).
Our robust training method incorporates the cost-driven
constraint into the node construction process of growing trees,
as shown in Figure 1. When any potential split x j < η (on the
j-th feature) is being considered, due to the constraint C( j),
there is a range of possible values a data point can be changed
into for that feature (formally defined in Section 3.1.1). Thus,
data points close to the splitting threshold η can potentially
cross the threshold. For example, on a low cost feature, many
data points can be easily perturbed to either the left child
or the right child. Therefore, the constraint gives us a set of
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Figure 1: An overview of cost-aware robust tree ensemble
training process. Our robust training algorithm incorporates
the cost-driven constraint while constructing nodes. The con-
straint specifies the set of data points that can potentially cross
the split threshold η given domain knowledge about the j-th
feature, i.e. uncertain set.
uncertain data points that can degrade the quality of the split,
as well as data points that cannot be moved from the two
children nodes. We need to quantify what is the worst quality
of the split under the constraint, in order to compute the gain
metric. To efficiently solve this, we propose a robust train-
ing algorithm that iteratively assigns training data points to
whichever side of the split with the worse gain, regardless of
the choice of the gain function and the type of tree ensem-
ble model. As an example, we can categorize every feature
into negligible, low, medium, or high cost to be increased and
decreased by the attacker. Then, we use a high-dimensional
box as the constraint. Essentially, the constraint gives the at-
tacker a larger increase (decrease) budget for features that
are easier to increase (decrease), and smaller budget for more
costly features. The cost-driven constraint helps the model
learn robustness that can maximize the cost of evasion for
the attacker. This utilizes the security expert domain knowl-
edge on features to increase the robustness of models. We
have implemented our training method in state-of-art tree en-
semble learning libraries: gradient boosted decision trees in
xgboost [12], and random forest in scikit-learn [4].
Since none of the existing training techniques support
cost modeling of features, we first evaluate the performance
of our new training algorithm without the cost-driven con-
straint, against the state-of-the-art robust tree ensemble train-
ing method [10]. To be consistent with existing work, we
follow the same settings to train a total of 20 models over 4
benchmark datasets with the goal of improving robustness
against attackers bounded by L∞-norm (Section 4.2). In the
gradient boosted decision trees evaluation, our robust training
algorithm achieves on average 2.94× and 1.26× improve-
ment over the baseline and state-of-the-art robust training
algorithm [10] respectively, in the minimal L∞ distance re-
quired to evade the model. In addition, we show that our al-
gorithm provides better solutions to the optimization problem
than the state-of-the-art [10] in 93% of the cases on average
(Section 4.2.4). For the random forest model, we are the first
to provide a general robust training algorithm over arbitrary
gain metrics, and therefore we evaluate against the regular
training in scikit-learn. On average over the four benchmark-
ing datasets, we achieve 3.2× robustness improvement in the
minimal L∞ evasion distance compared to the baseline. This
shows that our core training technique alone has made signifi-
cant improvements to solve the robust optimization problem.
Next, we evaluate the cost-aware robust training method for
security, using twitter spam URL detection as a case study. We
reimplement the feature extraction over the dataset from [31]
to detect malicious URLs posted by twitter spammers. The
features capture that attackers reuse hosting infrastructure
resources, use long redirection chains across different geo-
graphical locations, and prefer flexibility of deploying dif-
ferent URLs. Based on domain knowledge, we specify the
cost-driven constraint to train a robust model, with key re-
sults summarized as follows. First, while the regularly trained
model ranks low cost features as most important, the cost-
aware robust model ranks the most costly features as the most
important ones. This shows that the cost-aware robust training
can guide the model to utilize more information from high
cost features. Second, our cost-aware robust model can in-
crease the minimal attack cost for the strongest whitebox
attacker [26] to evade the robust model. We optimize an
adaptive attack objective (i.e., weighted sum of feature in-
creases and decreases) according to the trained constraint,
that minimizes the attack costs against the twitter spam clas-
sifier. Our results show that the adaptive attacker needs on
average 6.4× cost to evade our robust model compared to the
baseline model.
Our contributions are summarized as the following:
• We propose a new cost modeling method to translate
domain knowledge about features into cost-driven con-
straint. Using the constraint, we can train models to
utilize domain knowledge outside the training data.
• We propose a new robust training algorithm to train cost-
aware robust tree ensembles for security, by integrating
the cost constraint. Our algorithm can be applied to ran-
dom forest model in scikit-learn, widely used by security
tasks, that cannot be robustly trained by previous works.
• We use twitter spam detection as the security applica-
tion to train a cost-aware robust tree ensemble model.
Our robust model ranks the high cost features as most
important, which can increase the adaptive attack cost to
evade the model by 6.4×.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Tree Ensembles
A decision tree model uses logical predicates to provide
predictions. Each internal node holds a predicate over some
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feature values. The tree structure guides the prediction path
from the root to a leaf node containing the predicted value.
An ensemble of trees consists of multiple decision trees,
which aggregates the predictions from individual trees. Popu-
lar aggregation functions include the average (random forest)
and the sum (gradient boosted decision tree) of the prediction
values from each decision tree.
2.1.1 Notations
We use the following notations for the tree ensemble in this
paper. The training dataset D has N data points with d features
D= {(xi,yi)|i= 1,2, ...,N}(xi ∈Rd ,y∈R). Each input xi can
be written as a d-dimensional vector, xi = [x1i ,x
2
i , ...,x
d
i ]. A
predicate p is in the form1 of x j < η, which evaluates the
j-th feature x j against the split threshold η. Specifically, for
the i-th training data, the predicate checks whether x ji < η. If
p = true, the decision tree guides the prediction path to the
left child, otherwise to the right child. The prediction process
repeats until xi reaches a leaf. We use a function f to denote
a decision tree, which gives a real-valued output for the input
data point x with the true label y. For classification trees, f (x)
represents the predicted probability for the true label y.
The most common decision tree learning algorithms use
a greedy strategy to construct the nodes from the root to the
leaves, e.g., notably CART [9], ID3 [41], and C4.5 [42]. The
algorithm greedily picks the best feature j∗ and the best split
value η∗ for each node, which partitions the data points that
reach the current node (I) to the left child (IL) and the right
child (IR), i.e., I = IL∪ IR. The training algorithm optimizes
the following objective using some score to maximize the
gain of the split:
j∗,η∗ = arg max
j,η
Gain(IL,LR) = arg max
j,η
(s(I)− s(IL, IR))
(1)
In Equation (1), s denotes a scoring function. For example,
we can use Shannon entropy, Gini impurity, or any general
loss function to evaluate the gain. After the split, the score be-
comes s(IL, IR), which can be calculated as the weighted sum
of the children scores. For example, using the Gini impurity,
we have Gain(IL,LR) = Gini(I)−Gini(IL, IR). A common
strategy to solve Equation (1) is to enumerate all the features
with all the possible split points to find the maximum gain.
When the dataset becomes too large to compute efficiently,
different optimization methods have been proposed to approx-
imate Equation (1), e.g., weighted quantile sketch [12]. The
learning algorithm chooses the best feature split with the max-
imum gain, and then recursively constructs the children nodes
in the same way, until the score does not improve or some
pre-determined threshold (e.g., maximum depth) is reached.
1Oblique trees which use multiple feature values in a predicate is rarely
used in an ensemble due to high construction costs [39].
A tree ensemble uses the weighted sum of prediction values
from K decision trees, where K is a parameter specified by
the user. Each decision tree can be represented as a function
ft . Then, the ensemble predicts the output yˆ as follows.
yˆ = φ(x) = a∗
K
∑
t=1
ft(x) (2)
Ensemble methods use bagging [6] or boosting [20, 21, 45]
to grow the decision trees. The methods avoid overfitting and
improves the performance of the tree ensemble over any single
decision tree. Random forest and gradient boosted decision
tree (GBDT) are the most widely used tree ensembles in the
industry. The random forest model uses a= 1K , and the GBDT
model set a= 1. They use different ensemble methods to grow
trees in parallel or sequentially, which we describe next.
2.1.2 Random Forest
Bagging. A random forest model uses bagging [6] to grow
the trees in parallel. Bagging, i.e., bootstrap aggregation, uses
a random subset of the training data and a random subset of
features to train individual learners.
For each decision tree ft , we first randomly sample N′ data
points from D to obtain the training dataset Dt = {(xi,yi)},
where |Dt |= N′ and N′ ≤ N. The training data sample Dt for
each decision tree can be drawn with or without replacement,
depending on the implementation. In the case that N′ = N,
the data points are sampled with replacement. Then, at every
step of the training algorithm that solves Equation (1), we ran-
domly select d′ features in I to find the optimal split, where
d′ ≤ d. The feature sampling is repeated until we finish grow-
ing the decision tree. The training data and feature sampling
helps avoid overfitting of the trained model.
The key distinguishing factors for random forest model
are the bagging method, and that the trees are trained inde-
pendently from each other. The gain can be computed using
any scoring function. We focus on the scikit-learn implemen-
tation of the random forest classifier since it is widely used
by related work. In scikit-learn, a decision tree computes the
predicted probability as the percentage of training samples
for each class reaching the leaf. It takes the class with the
highest predicted probability to be the predicted class. The
ensemble realizes the majority vote by taking the most likely
class given averaged predicted values from the trees.
Random forest model has been used for various security ap-
plications, e.g., detecting malware distribution [30], malicious
autonomous system [29], social engineering [38], phishing
emails [15, 19, 23], advertising resources for ad blocker [25],
and online scams [28, 44], etc. Researchers use the model-
level feature importance ranking (Section 2.1.4) as a common
approach to interpret the trained random forest model. In
some cases, researchers have also analyzed the performance
of the model (e.g., ROC curve) given different subsets of
the features to reason about the predictive power of feature
categories.
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2.1.3 Gradient Boosted Decision Tree
Boosting. Gradient boosted decision tree (GBDT) model
uses boosting [20,21,45] to grow the trees sequentially. Boost-
ing iteratively train the learners, improving the new learner’s
performance by focusing on data that were misclassified by
existing learners. Gradient boosting generalizes the boosting
method to use an arbitrarily differentiable loss function.
In this paper, we focus on the state-of-the-art GBDT train-
ing system xgboost [12]. When growing a new tree ( ft), all
previous trees ( f1, f2, ..., ft−1) are fixed. Using yˆ(t) to denote
the predicted value at the t-th iteration of adding trees, xgboost
minimizes the regularized loss L(t) for the entire ensemble,
as the scoring function in Equation (1).
L(t) =
n
∑
i=1
l(yi, yˆ(t))+
t
∑
i=1
Ω( fi) (3)
In the equation, l is an arbitrary loss function, e.g., cross
entropy; and Ω( fi) is the regularization term, which captures
the complexity of the i-th tree, and encourages simpler trees
to avoid overfitting.
Xgboost proposes the following regularization term, where
T is the number of leaves in the t-th tree, w are the leaf weights
used as the prediction, and γ and λ are hyperparameters.
Ω( ft) = γT +
1
2
λ‖w‖2 (4)
The design of the regularization term by xgboost pro-
vides a closed form for the optimal leaf weights and min-
imal loss L˜(t)struct given the current tree structure, represented
by T leaves where each leaf contains a set of training data
points as I j. In particular, gi = ∂yˆ(t−1)(l(yi, yˆ
(t−1)), and hi =
∂2
yˆ(t−1)(l(yi, yˆ
(t−1)) are the first order and second order gradi-
ents for the i-th data point.
L˜(t)struct =−
1
2
T
∑
j=1
[
(∑i∈I j gi)
2
∑i∈I j hi+λ
]
+ γT (5)
Using the optimal solution (Equation (5)) as the scoring
function for Equation (1), the gain can be computed as:
Gain(IL,LR)
=
1
2
[
(∑i∈IL gi)
2
∑i∈IL hi+λ
+
(∑i∈IR gi)
2
∑i∈IR hi+λ
− (∑i∈I gi)
2
∑i∈I hi+λ
]
− γ (6)
Boosting makes the newer tree dependent on previously
grown trees. Previously, random forest was considered to
generalize better than gradient boosting, since boosting alone
could overfit the training data without tree pruning, whereas
bagging avoids that. The regularization term introduced by
xgboost significantly improves the generalization of GBDT.
2.1.4 Feature Importance
Among non-linear classifiers with strong predictive power,
tree ensembles offer unique model-level feature importance
ranking. Once trained, random forest and gradient boosted de-
cision tree models have the same model structure. Therefore,
feature importance ranking can be computed in the same way.
There are mainly two ways to measure the feature impor-
tance in a tree ensemble, the mean increase gain (MIG) and
mean decrease accuracy (MDA). Mean increase gain is com-
monly named as mean decrease impurity, originally proposed
in [9] since the decrease in gini impurity has been used as the
increase in gain. MIG adds up the weighted average gain for
a feature in every tree, where the weight is the percentage of
samples that are split by the feature. The mean decrease accu-
racy (MDA) [7, 8] measures the average decrease in accuracy
of the ensemble, when the values of a feature are randomly
permuted in out-of-bag samples (e.g., validation set). We use
mean increase gain (MIG) as the feature importance measure
in this paper, as evaluated by related work.
2.2 Evading Tree Ensembles
2.2.1 Threat Model
We evaluate the robustness of a tree ensemble by analyzing
the potential evasion caused by the strongest whitebox adver-
sary, the Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) attacker. The
adversary has whitebox access to the model structure, model
parameters and the prediction score.
2.2.2 MILP Attack
Strongest whitebox attack. Kantchelian et al. [26] have
proposed to attack tree ensembles by constructing a mixed
integer linear program, where the variables of the program are
nodes of the trees, the objective is to minimize a distance (e.g.,
Lp norm distance) between the evasive example and the at-
tacked data point, and the constraints of the program are based
on the model structure. The constraints include model misla-
bel requirement, logical consistency among leaves and pred-
icates. Using a solver, the MILP attack can find adversarial
example with the minimal evasion distance. Otherwise, if the
solver says the program is infeasible, there truly does not exist
an adversarial example by perturbing the attacked data point.
Since the attack is based on a linear program, we can use it to
minimize any objective in the linear form.
Adversarial training limitation. The MILP attack cannot
be efficiently used for adversarial training, e.g., it can take
up to an hour to generate one adversarial example [11] de-
pending on the model size. In addition, we want models to
learn knowledge about features. Therefore, we integrate the
cost-driven constraint into the training process directly.
2.3 Related Work
Lowd and Meek [35] propose a linear attack cost function
to model the feature importance. It is a weighted sum of ab-
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solute feature differences between the original data point and
the evasive instance. Incer et al. [24] train monotonic clas-
sifiers with the assumption that the cost of decreasing some
feature values is much higher compared to increasing them,
such that attackers cannot evade by increasing feature values.
In comparison, our cost-driven constraint is not restricted to
the linear form, and we model difficulties in both increasing
and decreasing feature values, since decreasing security fea-
tures can incur costs of decreased utility [13, 27]. Zhang and
Evans [50] are the first to train cost-sensitive robustness with
regard to classification output error costs, since some errors
have more catastrophic consequences than others [17]. Their
work models the cost of classifier’s output, whereas we model
the cost of perturbing the input features to the classifier.
There are several attacks against ensemble trees. The
strongest whitebox attack is the Mixed Integer Linear Program
(MILP) attack [26], which finds the exact minimal evasion dis-
tance to the model if an adversarial example exists. Another
whitebox attack proposed by Papernot et al. [40] is based
on heuristics. The attack searches for leaves with different
classes within the neighborhood of the targeted leaf of the
benign example, to find a small perturbation that results in a
wrong prediction. Among the blackbox attacks, Cheng et al.’s
attack [14] has been demonstrated to work on ensemble trees.
The attack minimizes the distance between a benign example
and the decision boundary, using a zeroth order optimization
algorithm with the randomized gradient-free method.
3 Methodology
In this section, we present our methodology to train robust
tree ensembles that utilize expert domain knowledge about
features. We first describe how to specify the attack cost-
driven constraint that capture the domain knowledge, then we
describe our robust training algorithm utilizing the constraint,
and lastly we propose a new objective for the adaptive attack
to minimize the cost to evaluate the robust model.
3.1 Attack Cost-driven Constraint
3.1.1 Constraint Definition
We define the cost-driven constraint for each feature x j to
be C(x j). It is a mapping from the interval [0,1], containing
normalized feature values, to a set in [0,1]× [0,1]. For each
concrete value of x j, C(x j) gives the valid feature manipu-
lation region according to the cost of changing the feature.
For example, as indicated by the constraint in Figure 2, when
x j = 0.7 for one data point, the constraint says that the cost
is acceptable for the attacker to perturb x j between 0.45 and
0.9. In general, the constraint can be anything specified by
the domain expert. Next, we will describe factors that affect
the cost, and give two example constraints.
0 1
1
0.7
L    bounded region
Valid feature 
manipulation region
∞
Feature
Constraint
Figure 2: An example of cost-driven constraint for feature x j.
The red area valid the potential feature manipulation region
under given cost-driven constraint C(x j) while the green area
represents the common L∞-norm bounded region. Lighter
red color means lower cost region, such that these feature
values can be perturbed more by the attacker. The L∞ region
is imprecise to capture the cost.
3.1.2 Cost Factors
Economic: The economic return on the attacker’s invest-
ment is a major motivation to whether they are willing to
change some features. For example, to evade blacklisting de-
tection, the attackers constantly register new domains and rent
new servers. Registering new domains is preferred since this
costs less money than renting a new server.
Functionality: Some features are related to malicious func-
tionalities of the attack. For example, the cryptojacking clas-
sifier [27] uses a feature that indicates whether the attack
website calls the CryptoNight hashing function to mine Mon-
ero coins. It is a high cost to remove the hash function since
the website can no longer mine Monero coins.
Suspiciousness: If the attacker needs to generate a lot more
malicious activities to perturb features (e.g., sending more
tweets than 99% of users), this makes the attack easier to be
detected and has a cost.
Monotonicity: In security applications, the cost to increase
a feature may be very different from decreasing it. For ex-
ample, to evade malware detection that use “static import”
features, it is easier to insert redundant libraries than to re-
move useful ones [24]. Therefore, we need to specify the cost
for both directions of the change.
Attack seed: If the attack starts modifying features from
a benign example (e.g., reverse mimicry attack), the cost of
changing features may be different from modifying features
from a malicious data point. Therefore, the classifier predic-
tion of the seed can affect the cost.
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Cost Value for l j, h j
Negligible α
Low β
Medium γ
High µ
Relationship µ < γ< β< α
Table 1: Feature manipulation cost categories based on do-
main knowledge. For each feature j, we categorize the cost
of increasing and decreasing its values and assign the bound
for the box constraint using variables l j and h j.
3.1.3 Box Cost Constraint
We describe how to specify the box constraint to translate
the security domain knowledge about features. For each fea-
ture, we categorize attacker’s cost of increasing and decreas-
ing its value, into one of the four categories: negligible, low,
medium, and high costs, based on relative cost differences,
rather than absolute scale.
Negligible cost. There is negligible cost to perturb some
features. For example, in the code transformation attack
against authorship attribution classifier, the attacker can re-
place a for loop with a while loop without modifying any
functionality of the code [43]. This changes the syntactic
features of the classifier but incurs negligible costs.
Low and medium cost. Altering some features generates
low or medium level of costs by comparison. For example,
registering a new phishing domain name is generally con-
sidered to be lower cost for the attacker than renting and
maintaining a new hosing server [33]. Therefore, increasing
domain name count features can be categorized as low cost,
whereas increasing IP address count features is medium cost.
High cost. If changing a feature significantly reduces the
attack effectivenss, or compromises the attacker, then it is a
high cost feature.
Box constraint. After assigning different categories to
increasing/decreasing features, we can map the knowledge
into a high dimensional box, to represent attacker’s prefer-
ence of changing the features belonging to each category.
Given m features, we have box constraint B formalized as
B = [−l1,h1]× [−l2,h2]× . . .× [−ld ,hd ], where l j,h j denote
the preferred lower and upper bound for the j-th feature value.
Table 1 shows a mapping from the categories to four nu-
merical values. All numerical values are between 0 and 1,
representing the percentage of change with regard to the max-
imal value of the feature. A higher cost category should allow
a smaller percentage of change than a lower cost category, to
be consistent with the feature robustness knowledge. Specifi-
cally, µ < γ< β< α. The box constraint is a simple example
of translating the domain knowledge about feature robustness
into cost-driven constraint, that can be used in the training
process.
Constraint. The box constraint corresponds to the follow-
ing.
C(x j) = [x j− l j,x j +h j], j = 1,2,3, ...,d (7)
It means that for j-th feature, the constraint maps the feature
to the interval [x j− l j,x j +h j] that represents the amount of
change as given the domain knowledge.
3.1.4 Conditioned Cost Constraint
We can use cost-driven constraint based on different condi-
tions of the data point, e.g., the attack seed factor. In general,
the constraint can vary for different feature values. For exam-
ple, we can design the constraint in Equation (8) where x ji
denotes the j-th feature value of data point xi.
C(x ji ) =

0 xi is benign
[x ji ,1] xi is mal, pred score > 0.9
[−0.1,0.1]∗ x ji xi is mal, pred score <= 0.9
(8)
In this example, we give different constraints for benign
and malicious data points for the j-th feature. If a data point xi
is benign, we assign a value zero, meaning that it is extremely
hard for the attacker to change the j-th feature value for a
benign data point. If the data point is malicious, we separate
to two cases. When the prediction score is higher than 0.9,
we enforce that x ji can only be increased. On the other hand,
when the prediction score is less than or equal to 0.9, we
allow a relative 10% change for both increase and decrease
directions, depending on the original value of x ji . Note that this
is different from the box constraint proposed in Section 3.1.3.
In the box constraint, we use the same percentage of change
for a feature regardless of different feature values x ji . The cost-
driven constraint allows us to capture and utilize all sorts of
domain knowledge from security researchers, that is outside
the training data.
3.2 Robust Training
Given attack cost-driven constraints specified by domain
experts, we propose a new robust training algorithm that can
integrate such information into the tree ensemble models.
3.2.1 Intuition
Using the box constraint as an example, we present the
intuition of our robust training algorithm in Figure 3. The
regular training algorithm of tree ensemble finds a non-robust
split (top), whereas our robust training algorithm can find a
robust split (bottom) given the attack cost-driven constraint.
Specifically in the example, it is easier to decrease the feature
x j than to increase it. The cost constraint to increase (decrease)
any x j is defined by h j (l j). Here x1, ...,x6 are six training
points with two different labels. The top of Figure 3 shows
that, in regular training, the best split threshold η over feature
x j is between x4 and x5, which perfectly separates the data
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Figure 3: The intuition behind the attack cost-driven con-
straints for robust training, given six training points with two
different classes (square and circle). It is easier to decrease x j
than to increase it for the attacker. In the top figure, the split
is 100% accurate without attacks, but only 66.6% accurate
under attacks. The split in the bottom figure is always robust,
but has a 83.3% accuracy.
points into left and right sets. However, given the attack cost
to change feature x j, x4 and x5 can both be easily perturbed by
the adversary and cross the splitting threshold η. Therefore,
the worst case accuracy under attacks is 66.6%, although
the accuracy is 100% without attacks. By integrating the
attack cost-driven constraints, we can choose a more robust
split, as shown in the bottom of Figure 3. Even though the
attacker can increase x j3 by up to h j, and decrease x
j
4 by up
to l j, the data points cannot cross the robust split threshold
η′. Therefore, the worst case accuracy under attacks is 83.3%,
higher than that from the naive split. As a tradeoff, x4 is
wrongly separated without attacks, which makes the regular
test accuracy 83.3% as well. As shown in the figure, using a
robust split can increase the minimal evasion distance for the
attacker to cross the split threshold.
3.2.2 Optimization Problem
In robust training, we want to maximize the gain computed
from potential splits (feature j and threshold η), given the
domain knowledge about how robust a feature x j is. We use
C to denote the attack cost-driven constraint. Following Equa-
tion (1), we have the following:
j∗,η∗ = arg max
j,η
Gain(IL,LR,C)
= arg max
j,η
(s(I,C)− s(IL, IR,C))
= arg max
j,η
(s(I)− s(IL, IR,C))
(9)
Project constraint into set ∆I. Since the robustness of the
feature does not change the score s(I) before the split (s(I,C)
is the same as s(I)), this only affects the score s(IL, IR,C) after
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Figure 4: A simple example to illustrate the uncertain set ∆I =
∆IL∪∆IR = [x3,x4,x5,x6] within the robust region [η−h j,η+
l j] on feature x j. Splitting threshold η splits the data points
into high confidence left set IL =∆IL∪ILc and high confidence
right set IR = ∆IR∪ IRc . The data points within the uncertain
set ∆I can be perturbed to cross the splitting threshold by
attacks while the data points outside the uncertain set (ILc ∪
IRc ) are certain to be robust under any possible attacks.
the split, which cannot be efficiently computed. Therefore, we
project the second term as the worst case score conditioned
on some training data points ∆I being perturbed given the
constraint function. The perturbations degrade the quality of
the split to two children sets I′L and I′R that are more impure or
with higher loss values. To best utilize the feature robustness
knowledge, we optimize for the maximal value of the score
after the split, given different children sets I′L and I′R under the
constraint:
s(IL, IR,C) = max
I′L,I′R,C
s(I′L, I
′
R)
= max
∆IL,∆IR
s(ILc ∪∆IL, IRc ∪∆IR)
(10)
Example. Different constraint functions result in differ-
ent ∆I set. As an example, Figure 4 explains how we can
map the box constraint for the j-th feature to an uncertain set
∆I containing variables to be optimized. We have nine data
points numbered from 1 to 9, i.e. I = {x1,x2, ...,x9}, with two
classes shaped in circles and squares. The training process
tries to put the splitting threshold η between every two con-
secutive data points, in order to get the splitting point with
maximum gain (Equation (1)). In Figure 4, the split value
under consideration is between data points x5 and x6. The
regular training process then computes the gain of the split
based on IL = {x1,x2,x3,x4,x5} and IR = {x6,x7,x8,x9}, us-
ing Equation 1. In the robust training process, we first project
the box constraint for the feature C( j) = [−l j,h j] into the
set ∆I = {x3,x4,x5,x6}. Since the points on the left side of
threshold η can be increased up to h j, and points on the right
side of η can be decreased by up to l j, we get the shaded
region of [η−h j,η+ l j] containing four data points that can
be perturbed to cross the splitting threshold η. Then, we need
to maximize the score after split under the box constraint.
Combinatorial optimization. Given any constraint func-
tion and the split under consideration ( j and η), we can calcu-
late the set of uncertain data points ∆I, the set of points that
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Algorithm 1 Robust Training Algorithm
Input: Training set D = {(xi,yi)}, |D|= N (xi ∈ Rd ,y ∈ R).
Input: data points of the current node I = {(xi,yi)}, |I|= m.
Input: attack cost-driven constraint C.
Input: the score function s.
Output: the best split at the current node j∗, η∗.
1: Initialize Gain∗ = 0; j∗ = 0;η∗ = 0
2: for j = 1 to d do
3: Sort I = {(xi,yi)} along the j-th feature as {(xti ,yti)}
4: for ti = t1 to tm do
5: if ti = t1 then
6: η← x jt1
7: else
8: η← 12 (xti + xti−1)
9: end if
10: Project C to the uncertain set ∆I.
11: IL = {(xi,yi)|x ji < η,x /∈ ∆I}
12: IR = {(xi,yi)|x ji > η,x /∈ ∆I}
13: /* Greedily put (xk,yk) to whichever side that has a
larger score. */
14: for every (xk,yk) in ∆I do
15: ls = s(IL∪{(xk,yk)}, IR)
16: rs = s(IL, IR∪{(xk,yk)})
17: if ls < rs then
18: IL = IL∪{(xk,yk)}
19: else
20: IR = IR∪{(xk,yk)}
21: end if
22: end for
23: /* Find the maximal gain. */
24: Gain( j,η, I) = s(I)− s(IL, IR)
25: if Gain( j,η, I)> Gain∗ then
26: j∗ = j;η∗ = η
27: Gain∗ = Gain( j,η, I)
28: end if
29: end for
30: end for
31: return j∗, η∗
are certainly assigned to the left side ILc and the right side IRc ,
respectively. Each point in ∆I can be assigned to either the
left side or the right side ∆I = ∆IL∪∆IR, with 2|∆I| possible
assignments. Finding the minimal gain within all possible
assignments is a combinatorial optimization problem. This
becomes intractable as Equation (10) needs to be repeatedly
solved during the training process. Therefore, to integrate fea-
ture robustness domain knowledge expressed in the constraint
function, we need to efficiently solve Equation (10).
3.2.3 Robust Training Algorithm
We propose a new robust training algorithm to efficiently
solve the optimization objective in Equation (10). Our al-
gorithm works for different types of trees, including both
classification and regression trees, different ensembles such
as gradient boosted decision trees and random forest, and
different splitting metrics used to compute the gain. Note that
existing work can only support xgboost trees [10].
Algorithm 1 describes our robust training algorithm. The
algorithm provides the optimal splitting features j∗ and the
splitting threshold η∗ as output. The input includes the train-
ing dataset, the set of data points that reach the current node
I = {(xi,yi)}, the attack cost-driven constraint function, and
a score function s. Example score functions are the cross-
entropy loss, Gini impurity, or Shannon entropy. From Line
10 to Line 28, the algorithm does robust training, and the
loops outside that are the procedure used in regular training
algorithm. The algorithm marches through every feature di-
mension (the for loop at Line 2), to compute the maximal
score after the split given the feature robustness knowledge,
for every possible split on that feature dimension. For each
feature j, we first sort all the data points along that dimen-
sion (Line 3). Then, we go through all the sorted data points
(xti ,yti) to consider the gain of a potential split x
j < η where
η is calculated from Line 5 to Line 9. Given the constraint
function C, we project that to the uncertain set ∆I and initial-
ize two more sets: IL contains the data points that stay on the
left side of the split, and IR contains the data points that stay
on the right (Line 10 to 12). Next, from Line 13 to Line
22, we go through every uncertain data point, and greedily
put it to either IL or IR, whichever gives a smaller gain for
the current split. After that, we compute the gain at Line 24,
and update the optimal split j∗, η∗ for the current node if the
current gain is the largest (Line 25 to 28). The algorithm
eventually returns the optimal split ( j∗, η∗) on Line 31.
3.3 Adaptive Attacker
To evaluate the robustness of a security classifier against
adaptive attacker, we use the cost-driven constraint to improve
the MILP attack objective. Specifically, we use the following
optimization objective for the attacker under the box cost
constraint to generate adversarial example x˜ by perturbing x:
minimize∑
j
a ju j|x˜ j− x j|+∑
j
(1−a j)v j|x˜ j− x j| (11)
Where a j is defined as the following:
a j =
{
0 x˜ j ≤ x j
1 x˜ j > x j
(12)
The cost objective is the weighted sum of absolute feature
value differences, with different weights for the increase and
decrease changes. Equation (11) uses weight u j to scale the
change in the j-th feature if the feature is increased, and v j to
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scale the decrease change, selected by the indicator variable
a j. We set weights u and v based on the inverse proportion
of the box of each feature dimension, since a larger weight
prefers a smaller feature change in the attack. This improves
the strongest whitebox attack by including the knowledge of
box contraint used in training. It minimizes the linear relation
of attack costs using the domain knowledge.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we first evaluate the effectiveness of our
core training technique (Section 4.2), and then we evaluate the
end-to-end robust training method on a security task, twitter
spam detection (Section 4.3).
4.1 Implementation
We implement our robust training algorithm in xgboost [12]
and scikit-learn [4]. The implementation in xgboost works
with all their supported differentiable loss functions for gra-
dient boosted decision trees. For scikit-learn, we implement
the robust training algorithm in random forest using the gini
impurity score.
4.2 Training Algorithm Evaluation
Since the state-of-the-art training method [10] does not
support cost model other than L∞-norm, we compare our core
training algorithm (Algorithm 1) against existing work with-
out any domain knowledge related cost modeling in this sec-
tion. Even though it is unfair to our technique, the experiments
in this section act as an ablation study to show the improve-
ments our Algorithm 1 makes to solve Equation (10). Same
as [10], we run our Algorithm 1 to train L∞-norm bounded
robustness as proposed in related work for each dataset.
4.2.1 Benchmark Datasets
We evaluate the robustness improvements in 4 benchmark
datasets: breast cancer, cod-rna, ijcnn, and binary MNIST (2
vs. 6). The size of the training/testing sets and the number of
features for these datasets are shown in Table 4. For consis-
tency, we follow the same experiment settings used in [10],
including number of trees, maximum depth, and trained ε for
L∞-norm bound. Same as [10], we randomly shuffle the test
set, and generate advesarial examples for 100 test data points
for breast cancer, ijcnn1, and binary MNIST, and 5000 test
points for cod-rna. We describe the details of each benchmark
dataset below.
breast cancer. The breast cancer dataset [1] contains 2 classes
of samples, each representing benign and malignant cells.
The attributes represent different measurements of the cell’s
physical properties (e.g., the uniformity of cell size/shape).
cod-rna. The cod-rna dataset [2] contains 2 classes of samples
representing sequenced genomes, categorized by the existence
of non-coding RNAs. The attributes contain information on
the genomes, including total free-energy change, sequence
length, and nucleotide frequencies.
ijcnn1. The ijcnn1 dataset [3] is from the IJCNN 2001 Neural
Network Competition. Each sample represents the state of a
physical system at a specific point in a time series, and has a
label indicating “normal firing" or “misfiring". The original 5
attributes in each sample are measurements of different prop-
erties of the physical system. Here, we use the 22-attribute
version of ijcnn, a transformation of original data, since it
turned out to achieve the best performance and won the com-
petition.
MNIST 2 vs. 6. The binary mnist dataset [5] contains hand-
written digits of “2" and “6". The attributes represent the gray
levels on each pixel location.
L∞ robustness definition. When the objective of the MILP
attack (Section 2.2.2) is to minimize the L∞ distance, the at-
tack provides the minimal L∞-norm distance that the attacker
needs to perturb in the features in order to evade the model. In
non-security related applications, a larger Lp robustness dis-
tance means that a model is more robust. For example, if the
MNIST classifier requires an average of 0.3 L∞ norm distance
changes in adversarial examples, the adversarial examples
look more differently from the original image, compared to
evading the baseline model with 0.06 L∞ norm robustness
distance. Therefore, the former model is more robust.
4.2.2 GBDT Results
We first evaluate the robustness of our training algorithm
on the gradient boosted decision trees (GBDT) models with
the four aforementioned benchmark datasets. We measure
the model robustness with the average L∞ distance of the
adversarial examples found by Kantchelian et al.’s MILP at-
tack [26]. Note that Kantchelian’s MILP attack is the strongest
whitebox attack under Lp-norm robustness distance for tree
ensemble models. We compare the robustness of the model
trained with our robust algorithm against those trained from
the regular training algorithm, as well as the state-of-the-art
robust training algorithm proposed by Chen et al. [10].
As shown in Table 2, the GBDT models trained with our
robust algorithms are more robust than the ones trained with
regular training method and state-of-the-art robust training
method. Specifically, it costs the Kantchelian et al.’s MILP at-
tack 2.94×more L∞ perturbation distance to evade our GBDT
models than regularly trained ones. Compared to the state-of-
the-art Chen and Zhang et al.’s robust training method [10],
our models require on average 1.26× larger L∞ perturbation
distances while our models still maintain relatively high ac-
curacy and low false positive rate. Note that the robustness
improvement of our trained models are limited on binary
MNIST dataset. This is because the trained and tested robust-
ness ranges L∞ ≤ 0.3 are fairly large for MNIST dataset. The
adversarial examples beyond that range are not imperceptible
any more and thus the robustness becomes extremely hard to
achieve without heavily sacrificing regular accuracy.
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Dataset
# of
trees
Trained ε Tree Depth Test ACC (%) Test FPR (%) Avg. l∞ Improv.
Chen’s ours natural Chen’s ours natural Chen’s ours natural Chen’s ours natural Chen’s ours natural Chen’s
breast-cancer 4 0.30 0.30 6 8 8 98.54 97.81 96.35 0.98 0.98 0.98 .2096 .3938 .5146 2.58x 1.31x
cod-rna 20 0.20 0.03 4 5 5 96.48 88.09 88.03 2.57 4.44 7.59 .0343 .0560 .0692 2.02x 1.24x
ijcnn1 60 0.20 0.02 8 8 8 97.91 96.03 93.65 1.64 2.15 1.62 .0268 .0326 .0463 1.73x 1.42x
MNIST 2 vs. 6 1,000 0.30 0.30 4 6 6 99.75 99.54 99.54 0.39 3.88 3.88 .0609 .3132 .3308 5.43x 1.06x
Table 2: Test accuracy and robustness of GBDT models trained by our algorithm (ours), compared to regularly trained models
(natural) and the models trained by Chen and Zhang et al.’s method [10] (Chen’s), in xgboost. We evaluate the model robustness
with the average l∞ distance of the adversarial examples found by Kantchelian’s MILP attack [26], the strongest whitebox attack.
The improvement (Improv.) here denotes the average l∞ robustness distance on our models over regularly trained ones and Chen
and Zhang’s.
Dataset
# of
trees
Trained ε Tree Depth Test ACC (%) Test FPR (%) Avg. l∞ Improv.
ours natural ours natural ours natural ours natural ours natural
breast-cancer 20 0.30 6 6 99.27 99.27 0.98 0.98 .2091 .3783 1.81x
cod-rna 60 0.20 14 14 96.55 89.11 2.97 5.28 .0437 .0686 1.57x
ijcnn1 80 0.10 14 14 97.90 92.24 1.54 0.06 .0278 .1151 4.14x
MNIST 2 vs. 6 60 0.30 14 14 99.55 99.30 0.38 0.48 .0484 .2558 5.29x
Table 3: Test accuracy and robustness of random forest models trained by our algorithm (ours) compared to regularly trained
models (natural), in scikit-learn. The improvement (Improv.) here denotes the average l∞ robustness distance on our models over
regularly trained ones.
Dataset Trainset size
Test
set size
# of
features
breast-cancer 546 137 10
cod-rna 59,535 271,617 8
ijcnn1 49,990 91,701 22
MNIST 2 vs. 6 11,876 1,990 784
Table 4: Training and testing set sizes, and number of features
for the four benchmark datasets.
4.2.3 Random Forest Results
In this subsection, we evaluate the robustness of random
forest models trained with our robust algorithms on the four
benchmark datasets. We implement our algorithm in a com-
monly used library scikit-learn [4]. to the best of our knowl-
edge, no robust training methods are available under that
setting using traditional gain metrics such as gini impurity
and shannon entropy. Thus, we only compare against regular
training algorithm for random forest models. We also measure
the robustness of random forest models with the average L∞
distance of adversarial examples found by Kantchelian et al.’s
MILP attack [26].
As shown in Table 3, the robustness of our random forest
models significantly outperforms the regularly trained ones.
Specifically, the average l∞ distance of adversarial examples
found by Kantchelian et al.’s MILP attack [26] is on average
3.2× larger than regular ones. On the other hand, there is only
a 3.3% drop of test accuracy and a 0.2% increase of false
positive rate on average for the robust models, although the
underlying optimization is much harder for robust training
than regular training.
4.2.4 Benefits of our robust algorithms over existing
heuristics
Here, we move one step further to provide insights on
why our robust training algorithm outperforms the state-of-
the-art Chen and Zhang et al.’s [10] and baseline training
methods as shown in Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. Essentially, the
robustness improvement mainly benefits from our proposed
robust algorithm in solving the maximization problem of
Equation (10).
According to Equation (10), our robust algorithm is de-
signed to maximize some impurity measure for each poten-
tial feature split during the training process. The higher the
score is obtained by the algorithm, the stronger capability of
the attacker is used for training, which guides the model to
learn stronger robustness. Therefore, how well the algorithm
can solve the maximization problem directly determines the
eventual robustness the models can learn. To that end, we
measure how our robust algorithm performs in solving the
maximization problem compared to the heuristics used in
state-of-the-art Chen and Zhang’s training algorithms [10] to
illustrate its effectiveness.
Dataset Better (%) Equal (%) Worse (%) Total
breast-cancer 99.74 0.26 0 3,047
cod-rna 94.13 4.66 1.21 35,597
ijcnn 90.31 1.11 8.58 424,825
MNIST 2 vs. 6 87.98 6.33 5.69 796,264
Table 5: The percentage of the cases where our robust algo-
rithm performs better, equally well, or worse than the heuris-
tics used in the state-of-the-art Chen and Zhang et al.’s robust
training algorithms [10] in solving the maximization problem
(Equation 10). The total number of cases represent the total
number of splits evaluated during robust optimization.
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On the four benchmark datasets, we measure the percent-
age of the cases where our robust algorithms can better solve
the maximization problem than the heuristics used in [10]
and summarize the results in Table 5. The results show that
our robust algorithm can provide a better solution than heuris-
tics used in Chen and Zhang et al.’s method [10] for at least
87.98% cases during the whole training process. On small
datasets like breast-cancer and cod-rna, our algorithm per-
forms equally or better for 100% and 98.79% cases respec-
tively. Such significant improvements in solving the max-
imizaation problem greatly benefit the robustness of our
trained models. The results provide insights on why our ro-
bust training algorithm can obtain more robust tree ensembles
than existing training methods.
4.3 Twitter Spam Detection Application
In this section, we apply our robust tree ensemble training
method to a classic security application, spam URL detection
on Twitter [31]. As a case study for security classifiers, we
want to answer the following questions in the evaluation:
• Cost-driven constraint: How to specify the cost-driven
constraint based on security domain knowledge?
• Model explainability: Does the robust model prefer
more robust features compared to the baseline model?
• Economic cost: Against the strongest whitebox at-
tack [26], does the robust model increase the economic
cost for the adaptive attacker to evade it?
4.3.1 Dataset
We obtain the public dataset used in Kwon et al.’s work [31]
to detect spam URLs posted on Twitter. Spammers spread
harmful URLs on social networks such as Twitter to distribute
malware, scam, or phishing content. These URLs go through
a series of redirections, and eventually reach a landing page
containing harmful content. The existing detectors proposed
in prior works often make decisions based on content-based
features that are strong in predictive power but easy to be
changed, e.g., different words used in the spam tweet. Kwon
et al. propose to use more robust features that incur monetary
or management cost to be changed under adversarial settings.
They extract these robust features from the URL redirection
chains (RC) and the corresponding connected components
(CC) formed by the chains.
Dataset Training Testing
Malicious 130,794 55,732
Benign 165,076 71,070
Total 295,870 126,802
Table 6: The size of Twitter spam dataset [31].
Feature extraction. We reimplemented and extracted 25
features from the dataset in the original paper, as shown in
Table 7. There are four families of features: shared resources-
driven, heterogeneity-driven, flexibility-driven, and user ac-
count and post level features. The key intuitions behind the
features are as follows. 1) Attackers reuse underlying host-
ing infrastructure to reduce the economic cost of renting and
maintaining servers. 2) Attackers use machines hosted on bul-
letproof hosting services or compromised machines to operate
the spam campaigns. These machines are located around the
world, which tend to spread over larger geographical distances
than benign hosting infrastructure, and it is hard for attackers
to control the geographic location distribution of their infras-
tructure. 3) Attackers want to maximize the flexibility of the
spam campaign, so they use many different initial URLs to
make the posts look distinct, and different domains in the long
redirection chains to be agile against takedowns. 4) Twitter
spammers utilize specific characters to spread harmful con-
tent, such as hashtags and ‘@’ mentions. We removed some
highly correlated features from the original paper. For exam-
ple, for a feature where the authors use both maximum and
average numbers, we use the average number only.
Kwon et al. labeled the dataset by crawling suspended users,
identifying benign users, and manually annotating tweets and
URLs. In total, there are 186,526 distinct malicious tweets
with spam URLs, and 236,146 benign ones. We randomly
split the labeled dataset into 70% training set and 30% testing
set as shown in Table 6. We extract the aforementioned 25
features from each data point and normalize the values to be
between 0 and 1 for training and testing.
4.3.2 Cost-driven Constraint
In order to obtain the cost-driven constraint for robust train-
ing, we first analyze the cost of changing the features and the
direction of the changes, then we specify a box contraint for
the cost accordingly.
Feature Analysis We categorize the features into low,
medium, and high cost to change, as shown in Table 7. We
analyze the cost based on feature families as follows.
• Shared resources: All features cost more to be decreased
than to be increased. If the attacker does not reuse the redi-
rector in the chain as much as before, the attacker needs
to set up additional redirector servers to maintain the same
level of spam activities (EntryURLid and AvgURLid fea-
tures). It costs even more to set up more servers for the
landing pages, since the landing URLs contain actual ma-
licious content, which are usually hosted on bulletproof
hosting (BPH) services. Feature AvgLdURLDom captures
how the attacker is reusing the malicious content hosting
infrastructure. If the value is decreased, the attacker will
need to set up more BPH severs, which has the highest cost
in the category.
• Heterogeneity: The total geographical distance traversed
by the URL nodes in the redirection chain has the highest
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Feature Name Description Cost Constraint Cost Weight
Decrease Increase Variables (li,hi) ui vi
Shared Resources-driven Features
EntryURLid In degree of the largest redirector Medium Negligible (-0.05, 0.2) 4 1
AvgURLid Average in degree of URL nodes in the RC Medium Negligible (-0.05, 0.2) 4 1
ChainWeight Total frequency of edges in the RC Low Negligible (-0.1, 0.2) 2 1
CCsize # of nodes in the CC Low Negligible (-0.1, 0.2) 2 1
CCdensity Edge density of the CC Low Negligible (-0.1, 0.2) 2 1
MinRCLen Min length of the RCs in the CC Low Negligible (-0.1, 0.2) 2 1
AvgLdURLDom Average domain # of landing URL IPs in the CC High Negligible (0, 0.2) ∞ 1
AvgURLDom Average domain # for the IPs in the RC Medium Negligible (-0.05, 0.2) 4 1
Heterogeneity-driven Features
GeoDist Total geo distance (km) traversed by the RC High Negligible (0, 0.2) ∞ 1
CntContinent # of unique continents in the RC Medium Negligible (-0.05, 0.2) 4 1
CntCountry # of unique countries in the RC Medium Negligible (-0.05, 0.2) 4 1
CntIP # of unique IPs in the RC Low Negligible (-0.1, 0.2) 2 1
CntDomain # of unique domains in the RC Low Negligible (-0.1, 0.2) 2 1
CntTLD # of unique TLDs in the RC Low Negligible (-0.1, 0.2) 2 1
Flexibility Features
ChainLen Length of the RC Low Negligible (-0.1, 0.2) 2 1
EntryURLDist Distance from initial URL to the largest redirector Low Negligible (-0.1, 0.2) 2 1
CntInitURL # of initial URLs in the CC Low Negligible (-0.1, 0.2) 2 1
CntInitURLDom Total domain name # in the initial URLs Low Negligible (-0.1, 0.2) 2 1
CntLdURL # of final landing URLs in the RC Low Negligible (-0.1, 0.2) 2 1
AvgIPperURL Average IP # per URL in the RC Low Negligible (-0.1, 0.2) 2 1
AvgIPperLdURL Average IP # per landing URL in the CC Low High (-0.1, 0) 2 ∞
User Account Features
Mention Count # of ‘@’ count to mention other users Negligible Low (-0.2, 0.1) 1 2
Hashtag Count # of hashtags Negligible Low (-0.2, 0.1) 1 2
Tweet Count # of tweets made by the user account Negligible Medium (-0.2, 0.05) 1 4
URL Percent Percentage of user posts that contain a URL Negligible Low (-0.2, 0.1) 1 2
∗CC: connected component. RC: redirection chain. BPH: bulletproof hosting.
Table 7: We reimplement 25 features used in [31] to detect twitter spam, among which three features have high cost to decrease
or increase. To maintain the same level of spam activities, the attacker needs to purchase more bulletproof hosting servers to host
the different landing pages if AvgLdURLDom feature is decreased or AvgIPperLdURL feature is increased. In addition, it is very
hard for the attacker to decrease the GeoDist feature. The last two columns assign the weights in Equation (11) used to minimize
attack cost for the adaptive attacker.
cost to change in general (GeoDist). If the attacker uses all
the available machines as resources for malicious activities,
it is hard to control the location of the machines and the
distance between them. Overall, it is harder to decrease
GeoDist to what looks more like benign value than to in-
crease it. Since GeoDist values for benign URL redirection
chains are very concentrated in one or two countries, the
attacker would need to purchase more expensive resources
located close by to mimic benign URL. The other four
features that count number of continents, countries, IPs,
domains, and top-level domains incur cost for decreased
flexibility and increased maintainence cost if the features
are decreased.
• Flexibility: All features in this family except the last one
have relatively low cost to decrease, because that decreases
the flexibility of the attack. The high cost feature AvgIP-
perLdURL counts the number of IP addresses that host the
malicious landing page URL. If the attacker wants more
flexibility of hosting the landing page on more BPH servers,
the cost will be increased significantly.
• User account: Increasing features in this family generally
increases suspiciousness of the user account. Among them,
increasing the tweet count is the most suspicious of all,
since a tweet is capped by 140 characters which limits
the number of mentions and hashtags, and percentage of
posts containing URLs is also capped. If a user account
sends too many tweets that puts the account to the top
suspicious percentile, it can be easily detected by simple
filtering mechanism and compromise the account.
Overall, three features have the highest cost to be perturbed:
AvgLdURLDom, GeoDist2, and AvgIPperLdURL. Decreas-
ing AvgLdURLDom and increasing AvgIPperLdURL incurs
cost to obtain more bulletproof hosting servers for the landing
page URL, and manipulating GeoDist is generally outside the
control of the attacker. Other types of actions can also achieve
the changes in AvgLdURLDom and AvgIPperLdURL, but it
will generally decrease the profit of the malicious operation.
To decrease AvgLdURLDom, if the attacker does not rent
more BPH servers but only reduces the number of malicious
landing pages, that reduces the profit. If the attacker increases
2GeoDist, CntContinent and CntCountry have similar intuition, but we
choose GeoDist since it has finer granularity in feature values.
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Model Cost Aware Cost Model # of trees Tree Depth ACC (%) FPR (%) Avg. Evasion Cost Improv.
Regular Training No N/A 30 8 99.38 0.89 0.010 N/A
Our Robust Model Yes Cost-driven constraint 150 24 96.96 4.1 0.064 6.4x
Table 8: Robustness improvement of twitter spam classification models. We use our new training algorithm to train a robust
gradient boosted decision trees model, and compare it against the baseline model. Results show that we achieve 6.4× evasion
cost increase against the adaptive whitebox attacker [26] who minimizes the attack cost (Equation (11)).
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(b) Robust Model.
Figure 5: The robust model ranks medium cost and high cost features higher than the baseline model. All three high cost features
are ranked within top ten most important features for the robust model.
the AvgIPperLdURL by using cheap servers, their malicious
content could be taken down more often that interrupts the
malicious operation.
Box Constraint Specification. We want to allow more
perturbations for low cost features than high cost ones, and
more perturbations on the low cost side (increase or decrease)
than the more costly side. So we give larger ranges for low
cost features, with direction of the ranges. We specify box
constraint according to Section 3.1.3 using the following
values: α= 0.2,β= 0.1,γ= 0.05,µ = 0. The corresponding
perturbation ranges for each feature is shown in the Constraint
Variables column in Table 7.
4.3.3 Robust Model
Using the cost-driven constraint, we trained a robust gra-
dient boosted decision trees using our implementation in xg-
boost. We compare against the baseline model trained by the
regular GBDT training method as shown in Table 8.
Model performance: our robust model has reasonable
performance while it can learn robustness under cost-
driven constraint. We achieve 96.96% accuracy and 4.1%
false positive rate by increasing the number of trees and max-
imum tree depth used in the robust training process (Table 8).
It is a known tradeoff that increasing the robustness of a clas-
sifier may decrease its regular test accuracy and increase the
false positive rate. In security applications, it is especially im-
portant to maintain low false positive rate to reduce the num-
ber of false alarms. Under some cost constraint settings, e.g.,
using (0, 0) as variables for the high cost features AvgLdURL-
Dom, GeoDist, and AvgIPperLdURL, we can train a model
with 2.9% FPR. Improving the false positive rate of the robust
model will be a direction for future work.
Feature importance ranking: our robust model ranks
high cost features as most importance ones, compared to
the baseline models. Figure 5 shows that the model trained
using our robust training algorithm ranks high cost features
as more important ones, compared to the baseline model. The
feature importance score is computed by the mean increase
gain (MIG, described in Section 2.1.4), that averages the con-
tribution of the loss reduction for splitting on the specific
features across the ensemble. Figure 5a shows that the base-
line model heavily relies on the Hashtag Count feature, such
that it has a very high feature importance score. Within top
ten most important features for the baseline model, six of
them are low cost features, and only one is high cost feature.
On the other hand, Figure 5b shows that all three high cost
features are within the top ten, and they rank much higher in
the robust model than the baseline model.
Robustness increase against adaptive attacker: our ro-
bust model can cause the attacker 6.4× times cost in-
crease for evasion compared to the baseline model. To
evaluate the robustness, we run the strongest whitebox MILP
attack [26] that minimizes the cost objective of feature
changes (Equation (11)). We run the attack from 100 ran-
domly selected malicious test data points. By perturbing the
malicious points, the attack finds the exact minimal cost to
generate adversarial examples for these data. On average,
our robust model obtains 6.4× increase in the minimial cost
compared to the baseline.
Other attacks. MILP attack is the strongest whitebox at-
tack against tree ensembles. We minimize the attack cost of
evasion, by setting the feature weights in the cost function
according to the same proportion used in the training (Equa-
tion (11) and Table 7). Therefore, this adaptive attack directly
targets the training technique. Stronger attacks require a more
complicated modeling of the evasion cost, which needs to
consider indirect cost not captured by the features, e.g., profit
of different malicious activity levels, change of suspicious-
ness and chances of being detected, etc. We plan to explore
these as future work.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have designed, implemented, and evalu-
ated a cost-aware robust training method to train tree ensem-
bles for security. We have proposed a cost modeling method
to capture the domain knowledge about features, and a ro-
bust training algorithm to integrate such knowledge. Using
our method, we have trained a robust twitter spam detection
model that prefers high cost features than low cost ones, while
maintaining reasonable performance. Moreover, our robust
model can increase the attack evasion cost by 6.4× against
the adaptive attacker.
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